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I. THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION RESTRICTIONS: A MANDATE
FOR CHANGE
In 1995, the threat of a major cut in federal legal services funding
loomed over legal services programs. Conservative members of Congress
advocated not only the "Contract with America" and the end of funding
to the National Endowment for the Arts, but also the demise of legal
services for indigent Americans. Ralph Reed, the Executive Director of
the Christian Coalition, compared the end of funding for legal services to
Ronald Reagan's firing of striking air traffic controllers: while legal serv-
ices was a relatively small budget item, its "formidable constituency"
meant its demise would be a "dramatic and symbolic" gesture of the tri-
umph of the new conservative government and would help pave the way
for further, larger program cuts.' In addition to drastic funding reduc-
tions, Congress contemplated imposing unprecedented restrictions on all
remaining legal services funding, a change as devastating to legal services
programs as the funding cuts themselves.2 These restrictions prohibited
legal services programs from doing much of their most important and ef-
ficient work, including litigating class actions on behalf of poor people,
addressing welfare reform issues, and advocating for poor clients re-
garding legislation and regulations that would have wide impact on their
lives. Moreover, the proposed restrictions were not limited to programs'
federal funds, but would apply to any funds legal services programs re-
ceived, such as state and local funding, foundation grants, and private
contributions.
t Executive Director of Community Legal Services, Inc. (CLS), in Philadelphia, PA.
ft Former Director of Planning at CLS and the 1997-98 Yale Law School Arthur Liman
Public Interest Fellow.
1. A Revolttion or Business as Usual? Republican Control of Congress, HARPER'S MAG.,
Mar. 1995, at 43, 46.
2. See, e.g., H.R. 1806 and S. 1221, versions of the "Legal Services Reform Bill of 1995."
The final version of these restrictions was passed in Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321.
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The staff and Board of Community Legal Services, Inc. of Philadel-
phia (CLS) watched these developments with deep concern. CLS, then
approaching its thirtieth anniversary as the legal services provider for the
city of Philadelphia, had a distinguished history of aggressive and effec-
tive advocacy on behalf of the indigent. In 1990, an article in the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly reviewed litigation brought by legal serv-
ices programs and concluded that CLS was the most successful legal
services provider in the nation.3
A significant amount of CLS's traditional work would have been pro-
hibited by the proposed restrictions. Moreover, CLS was still suffering
the aftermath of an unexpected loss of state funding in the summer of
1994, and had a significant longstanding budget deficit that had necessi-
tated office closings and staff reductions. Further funding cuts were unfa-
thomable in an organization already stretched far beyond its means.
However, in the summer of 1995, it became obvious that funding cuts
and the proposed congressional restrictions were virtually certain to be
imposed. In Philadelphia, federal funding was likely to be reduced to $2.4
million, a $1 million reduction. This was an enormous loss for a program
already struggling with a sizeable deficit and a total budget of only $7.5
million. By September 1995, the news from Washington legal services
lobbyists was clear: cuts and restrictions were inevitable, though the full
extent of the changes was still unknown.
Management at CLS quickly determined that the organization simply
could not accept federal money, which until that time had comprised
about 40% of CLS's budget, if doing so would prevent it from engaging
3. See 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745, 773 (1992). For examples of successful litigation
brought or co-counseled by CLS, see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990) (successful chal-
lenge to federal regulations regarding eligibility of children with disabilities for supplemental
security income benefits); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (establishing rights of in-
stitutionalized persons to receive appropriate care); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(holding replevin with bond creditor procedures unconstitutional); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S.
191 (1972) (holding confession of judgment unconstitutional); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (holding a citizenship requirement in a state welfare program unconstitutional);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that residency requirements for state wel-
fare programs are unconstitutional); Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216 (3d Cir. 1993) (successful
challenge to Secretary of Health and Human Services' rules and policies for determining eligi-
bility for disability benefits of people infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV));
Robinson v. Block, 869 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding a challenge to a state's interpretation
of eligibility requirements for food stamp benefits); Kuehner v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.
1985) (challenging the termination of payments to 500,000 Social Security and Supplemental
Security Income recipients across the country); Ferrell v. Pierce, 734 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1984)
(enjoining the implementation of a major change in the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment's mortgage relief program); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980) (striking
down Pennsylvania rules that allowed creditors to seize consumers' bank accounts containing
social security benefits without notice); Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912 (3d
Cir. 1978) (upholding a challenge to longstanding race discrimination in state police hiring and
promotion practices); and Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979) (establishing an
implied warranty of habitability in residential leases).
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in some of its most significant work and using on behalf of its clients all
the litigation tools other clients enjoy. Moreover, CLS feared losing a
number of other funding sources if it accepted federal money and the re-
strictions that came with it. For example, CLS received foundation grants
to do outreach to senior citizens and to families of children with disabili-
ties. The restrictions included a prohibition on "solicitation" designed to
prevent legal services attorneys from meeting with farm workers and of-
fering to represent them, but which seemed to similarly prohibit a trip to
a nursing home or school for the disabled to meet poor clients with legal
needs. Thus, CLS's continued ability to fulfill its obligations on its out-
reach grants would have been in question under the proposed restric-
tions. Finally, CLS depended on income from attorneys' fees provided
pursuant to a variety of federal fee statutes. The proposed restrictions
prohibited receipt of that income. CLS feared they might also prohibit
receipt of significant other state funding received for Social Security dis-
ability cases.
The solution seemed clear, but far from simple. There would have to
be two legal services organizations in the city: one that would accept the
federal money and live within the restrictions, and another that would
rely on other funding and continue the broad range of work in which
CLS had always engaged. Because of its relationships with a variety of
government and non-profit funders, and its organizational history of per-
forming a broad range of work, CLS was the obvious choice to retain all
nonfederal funding and to continue to perform unrestricted work. A new
organization could be formed to bid on federal money.
In anticipating this change, CLS realized that the toll on the organiza-
tion's morale, efficiency, and-at least temporarily-productivity would
be tremendous. Because giving up federal funding meant the loss of $2.4
million, CLS would be forced to make many reductions in both staff and
office space. While CLS hoped the new organization would hire the staff
CLS laid off, the $1 million reduction in the remaining federal funding
meant that many employees would end up without jobs, and office and
unit structures would be severely disrupted. Taking one agency with
three locations, a variety of specialized units, and 133 staff persons (most
of whom had spent far more than a decade at CLS), and creating instead
two agencies that would have to coordinate intake and advocacy was ex-
tremely complicated. Moreover, staff was represented by two unions,
each with a different layoff procedure that controlled who could be laid
off from CLS and who, therefore, was likely to staff the new organiza-
tion.
Despite these issues, CLS's Board proved supportive of manage-
ment's plan to reject federal funding. Indeed, the Board's client represen-
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tatives expressed passionately their belief that a full range of legal serv-
ices had to be available to indigent clients and that it was essential that
CLS remain unfettered by the proposed restrictions. In October 1995, the
Board unanimously approved management's proposal to give up its larg-
est source of funds. Arrangements for restructuring and downsizing then
began in earnest.
Although no one was certain when Congress would actually pass the
legal services legislation, the Board and management sought to establish
both a smaller CLS and a new organization that could begin operating
with federal money by January 1, 1996, since that was the earliest possi-
ble date for implementation of the restrictions. If the new organization
was in place by that date, staff members could be laid off by one organi-
zation and hired by the other without gaps either in their employment or
the provision of services. The Philadelphia Bar Association played a
critical role in effectuating the plan, just as it had played a critical role in
the formation of CLS almost 30 years before. It promptly incorporated a
new entity, Philadelphia Legal Assistance Center (PLA), to bid on fed-
eral funds. The Bar Chancellor, Abraham C. Reich, quickly appointed a
board. With a special grant from the IOLTA program, the PLA Board
hired CLS's Personnel Director, who had more than 20 years experience
at CLS, as Acting Executive Director. She then prepared the funding re-
quest for submission to the federal Legal Services Corporation.
With the creation of a new organization, negotiations began between
the two legal services agencies regarding staffing and coordination of in-
take and substantive work. The Legal Services Corporation had not yet
issued any guidelines on what interaction it would permit between LSC
and non-LSC funded organizations, so both programs agreed to proceed
conservatively in defining the CLS/PLA relationship. CLS was blessed
with expert pro bono counsel from one of the City's largest and most re-
spected law firms, Morgan, Lewis and Bockius, which provided concrete
advice on establishing separate corporate identities. Similarly, the firm's
labor lawyers were available to assist in union negotiations regarding lay-
offs and related personnel matters.
To avoid duplication and maintain program integrity, PLA's Acting
Executive Director and CLS management sat down together to plan
what the two organizations would do and what kind of staffing each
would require. The decisions involved dismantling existing units and
closing one of the two remaining neighborhood offices. As a result, staff
members who had worked together for decades would be separated and
some would lose their jobs altogether. In making these difficult deci-
sions, CLS and PLA agreed on several principles:
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* the design of the programs and their relationship should ensure
that both would be exciting, vibrant, high-quality law firms doing
high-quality work;
" both programs would cooperate to meet the needs of clients and
avoid competition;
" both would handle individual cases rather than having one focus
exclusively on impact or policy work;
* work and intake responsibilities would be distributed between the
two organizations in a manner that took into account the restric-
tions imposed by various funding sources and maximized the
ability to use unrestricted funds to provide a full range of advo-
cacy for clients;4 and
* the two programs would seek to create a seamless array of serv-
ices for clients and minimize the client inconvenience caused by
the existence of two entities.
Using these principles, CLS and PLA analyzed CLS's work and en-
deavored to divide up areas of expertise and types of cases between the
two organizations. LSC restrictions and the requirements of other fund-
ing streams dictated many of the decisions and made them quite compli-
cated. For example, because CLS's state funding could not be used for
welfare work, while PLA's federal funds allowed representation in indi-
vidual welfare cases, PLA took on most of those cases. But because PLA
would not be permitted under the federal restrictions to challenge wel-
fare "reform," CLS agreed to continue handling those issues using unre-
stricted funds. Areas in which CLS had traditionally engaged in a great
deal of legislative advocacy or class action litigation would stay at CLS.
Similarly, staff who spent more time on such work or who generated sig-
nificant attorneys' fees would be retained by CLS.
The goal in coordinating intake was to ensure clients could easily un-
derstand where to receive services and to minimize shuttling clients back
and forth between the two organizations. Locating PLA's intake in the
same building in which CLS had its main office was essential to achieving
this goal. Fortunately, there was an empty floor in the office building that
housed CLS's main office. PLA renovated that space to meet its needs,
and subleased an additional floor that CLS would no longer require. CLS
and PLA staff stationed on the building's ground floor could direct cli-
4. In addition to facing the new restrictions on federal funds, legal services programs were
also bound by numerous restrictions imposed by other funding sources. Other funders, however,
did not mandate that restrictions on their funds be applied to other monies the legal services
provider received. For a description of restrictions on Pennsylvania legal services funding
sources, see Laurence E. Norton, II, Not Too Much Justice for the Poor, 101 DICK. L. REv. 601,
609 (1997).
Yale Law & Policy Review
ents to the receptionist at the appropriate organization, based on the type
of problem for which the client was seeking assistance. Moreover, hous-
ing PLA in the same building as CLS's main office and several other
public interest law offices, including the Philadelphia Bar's pro bono re-
ferral project, allowed PLA staff to share CLS's library and to maintain
close and efficient ties with the other organizations.
The two organizations rapidly created a plan addressing all aspects of
the new arrangement. The plan could not be implemented, however,
without the cooperation of the unions. PLA sought to hire certain CLS
paralegals and support staff with skill in the areas for which it would be
responsible. While CLS supported this goal, it could not force many of
those employees to leave since the support staff's union contract required
that layoffs be based only on seniority. Similarly, the attorneys, who had
their own union, had a complicated layoff clause that could make it diffi-
cult or even impossible for management to lay off the number of attor-
neys required to make the plan work. Meetings with both unions and
staff to discuss the plan proved fruitful. Not surprisingly in view of the
CLS culture, staff believed that providing poor clients with a full range of
legal options was central to CLS's mission and history, and worked coop-
eratively to accomplish the changes. The unions respected CLS's organ-
izational goal of avoiding the federal restrictions and saw their role as
protecting staff jobs and salaries in both organizations. Legally, if PLA
hired many former CLS employees, the unions would represent the em-
ployees at their new jobs. Because the union that represented support
staff, including the paralegals, was interested in seeing paralegals con-
tinue to work in their areas of expertise, it agreed that staff PLA wanted
to hire would voluntarily resign from CLS and accept jobs at PLA. The
attorneys' union also worked out a plan that gave management some
flexibility but protected the union members' rights. CLS was permitted to
lay off the requisite number of attorneys, but those who were hired by
PLA were provided with recall rights if job openings occurred at CLS.
Union negotiations went on into December, but PLA met its January
1, 1996 start-up goal. Attorneys, secretaries, paralegals and administra-
tive staff left CLS and began employment with the new organization as of
that date. Responsibility for many client cases was transferred; clients
were notified that CLS would no longer represent them and new retainer
agreements were executed for representation by PLA. Although neces-
sary, these tasks were quite burdensome and required a great deal of pa-
perwork and attention by casehandlers at both organizations who were
still trying to manage their existing heavy caseloads. During the transition
period, CLS was forced to close new client intake and PLA took some
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time to get its system up and running. But staff at both organizations
managed to minimize the disruption in service to clients.
As a result of the reduction in federal funding, many staff members
lost their jobs in January. Most had over a decade of work experience
with the organization. CLS management targeted clerical and administra-
tive jobs in an attempt to minimize the impact on clients, but the emo-
tional toll on both departing and remaining staff was enormous. In addi-
tion to the layoffs of a few casehandlers, there was additional attorney
attrition. Because of budgetary concerns, those who left were not re-
placed. Thus all remaining staff, both administrative and legal, faced
heavier work burdens even as they confronted major administrative and
organizational changes.
Because of the lack of funds, part of the plan included the closure of
one of CLS's two remaining neighborhood offices. Early in 1996, the
lease for the office was terminated; the library was sold; and staff, furni-
ture and files were moved downtown. This decision was a particularly
emotional one as staff had built strong relationships with and commit-
ment to the neighborhood in which the office was situated and had a
strong sense of office identity. Moreover, office closings implicated man-
agement hierarchies and led in part to the decision of several longstand-
ing staff attorneys to leave CLS. After the office closed, only two sites for
intake of new cases remained. Only two years earlier, however, CLS had
operated a downtown office in addition to four neighborhood sites.
Defining the role of the one remaining neighborhood office was diffi-
cult. It had been easy to define intake responsibilities based on neighbor-
hoods when offices existed throughout the city. One remaining neigh-
borhood office with limited staff and tremendous demand for service was
inconsistent with the centralized model with shared intake between two
organizations at one downtown location. However, fiscally there were
compelling reasons to keep it open. The lease was the least expensive of
all the offices and staff valued the information gathered from the connec-
tion to one poor neighborhood. Because of staff limitations, intake hours
were limited and staff continued to feel overwhelmed by both intake and
community obligations. Nevertheless, the neighborhood office main-
tained a sense of camaraderie not replicated at the downtown office.
As 1996 began, CLS management felt somewhat amazed at all that
had been accomplished in only a few months. A new organization was in
operation with its own management team and funding. While CLS's cash
flow was a constant problem, exacerbated by the absence of the tradi-
tional influx of federal funding early in the calendar year, the organiza-
tion expected to finish the fiscal year in June with a deficit only slightly
larger than in the previous year. Client representation continued. Staff
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morale suffered from the changes, losses, and continuing fiscal austerity,
but rallied in recognition of what the organization had accomplished. In
the meantime, the logjam in Congress over the budget held up passage of
the restrictions CLS anticipated. PLA operated under the old LSC rules
on a month-by-month basis until Congress worked out its differences.
Some staff, wondering if the restrictions would not in fact be enacted,
contemplated reuniting PLA and CLS. However, on April 29, 1996,
Congress passed the Omnibus Consolidated and Appropriations Act of
1996,5 which included both the feared budget reductions and the most
harmful restrictions.
For more than three years now, Philadelphia has operated with two
legal services organizations. Two boards, two management teams, and
two staffs serve the same clients. The organizations share a library under
a leasing agreement, and have contracts for the shared use of some staff.
These arrangements are carefully crafted to preserve each program's in-
tegrity in accordance with legal requirements. Each organization has its
own timekeeping systems, fiscal staff, annual audit, personnel policies,
benefit plans, insurance contracts, computer network, hiring processes,
union negotiations, and management meetings.6 The two organizations
work together and with a number of other public interest providers. Task
forces of Philadelphia public interest attorneys and paralegals doing pub-
lic benefits, employment, consumer, and housing work meet to discuss
issues and coordinate activities. Cases are referred among the groups,
personal relationships among attorneys who used to work together assist
in creating cooperative relationships, and recently hired public interest
attorneys are creating their own network to build such ties.
Yet the challenge has been not how to keep the organizations sepa-
rate as required, but rather how to continue to work together to avoid
duplication of service, competition for funds, and administrative ineffi-
ciency, and to ensure that information and substantive expertise are
shared. Employees at both CLS and PLA have developed institutional
allegiances to the agency at which they work. These allegiances inevitably
cause tensions when CLS and PLA face conflicts in staffing, funding, and
the division of substantive work. For example, as the two organizations
each interview and hire new attorneys, they compete for the same re-
cruits, and even existing staff can be lured from one organization to the
other. The lack of formal relationship means neither organization can in-
5. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 100 Stat. 1321 See. 504(a).
6. Since 1995 the federal Legal Services Corporation has trumpeted the administrative ad-
vantages of fewer, larger legal services providers and advocated statewide planning processes to
consolidate and merge programs. At the same time, the new Congressional funding restrictions
have yielded the opposite result: the creation of new programs and related administrative ineffi-
ciencies.
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tervene if its staff thinks the other is mishandling cases or mismanaging
its intake system. Moreover, staff morale may be affected by employees'
perception that one entity is more respected than the other or that one
bears a heavier client burden. A question of enormous significance to the
organizations' long term relationship is whether PLA will continue to re-
frain from seeking any funds for which CLS could apply. This was a basic
principle of PLA's creation and arose from the legal community's com-
mitment to ensuring that all available nonfederal funds would remain un-
tainted by the unacceptable federal restrictions. But will PLA's own
sense of organizational integrity and the remaining unmet needs of its
clients push it to seek new funding? It will take ongoing efforts by every-
one in legal services and oversight from the larger legal community and
7legal services funders to minimize these conflicts in the coming years.
II. MANAGEMENT IN A NEW ERA
The creation of PLA was only the beginning of a series of changes for
CLS, which remained seriously underfunded. The organization had car-
ried a significant deficit off and on for years. Cash flow was erratic, bills
went unpaid for long periods of time, and making payroll was a continu-
ing concern. Staff and its work were affected as there was little money for
training, conferences, publications, consultants, experts or translators.
For years the agency had avoided costly improvements. Photocopying
machines were old and unreliable. Thanks to a generous one-time foun-
dation grant and other donations, most casehandlers had personal com-
puters on their desks. However, the agency had no network or e-mail,
limited software, and no training or support budget. Furniture had not
been purchased in over ten years and the neighborhood office looked
dilapidated and dirty.
While CLS suffered with these continuing frustrations, the message of
the 1990s to nonprofit managers stressed downsizing, accountability and
efficiency. For example, the state legal services funder imposed a time-
keeping requirement, mandating that staff document time spent on ac-
tivities for the first time in the organization's history. Telephone intake
systems were highly touted at national legal services gatherings due to
7. Everyone involved with the creation of PLA hoped it would be a temporary agency. Un-
fortunately, there has not been any action in Congress to remove the restrictions or the provi-
sion that the restrictions apply to all funds a recipient receives. Meanwhile, litigation has been
filed challenging the legality of the restrictions, including two cases that upheld the restrictions
but are now pending on appeal in U.S. Circuit Courts. See Legal Aid Society of Hawaii v. Legal
Servs. Corp., 981 F.Supp. 1288 (D. Haw. 1997), cert. denied, No. 98-296, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 7588
(Nov. 30, 1998); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), appeal
pending. In Varshavsky v. Perales, no. 40767/91, slip op. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Dec. 24, 1996),
Justice Beverly Cohen held that the LSC restriction prohibiting involvement in class actions was
unconstitutional insofar as it barred such advocacy even when paid for with non-LSC funds.
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their promise of high-volume efficiency. "Strategic planning" became the
non-profit buzzword. There were signs that funders expected balanced
budgets. Indeed, one major local foundation announced that it would not
make grants to arts institutions whose deficits exceeded a fixed percent-
age of their total budget. CLS's difficult fiscal situation was inconsistent
with these expectations. Therefore, CLS management adopted a three-
part response. First, it would eliminate its budget deficit through contin-
ued and increased fiscal austerity coupled with aggressive fundraising.
Second, once the budget permitted, it would authorize spending to im-
prove efficiency, giving this priority over increased staffing. Ineffective
machinery and phone systems would be replaced; an up-to-date com-
puter system with supports and training would be provided; buildings
would be upgraded and repaired; staff development funds would be
made available; funding for necessary experts, consultants, and publica-
tions would be budgeted. Third, CLS would address management issues
by retooling a loose management culture that tolerated unproductive
staff and was complicated by longstanding interpersonal tensions.
CLS's failure to adequately address its deficit earlier was largely the
result of an organizational culture that protected employees from layoffs
and could not significantly reduce costs without staff reductions. As an
organization committed to protecting the most vulnerable and under-
privileged and that frequently assisted the victims of layoffs and termina-
tions, CLS knew the toll job loss would take on individual lives. Moreo-
ver, the organization had hired many staff persons from the
neighborhoods it served, and understood that these employees, particu-
larly the older ones, would face real perils without steady income. Finally,
the longevity of management's personal relationships with these staff
members made the prospect of layoffs particularly painful. Changing the
anti-layoff culture was difficult, but the loss of federal funds in 1996 cou-
pled with continuing insecurity about both CLS's and PLA's survival ne-
cessitated significant staffing cutbacks. When the state once again re-
duced funding in July 1996, a second round of layoffs, targeted primarily
at senior administrative staff, seemed less foreign though equally painful.
In further response to the budget deficit, CLS changed its approach to
fundraising. Previously, attorneys worked without much attention to
whether specific funding was available. However, with limited staff, a
greater percentage of restricted funds, and new timekeeping require-
ments, management began requiring staff to assist in raising money for
important work that had no dedicated funding source. While fundraising
had previously been almost exclusively the province of management, at-
torneys were now pushed to engage in grant-writing and reporting. This
new responsibility burdened attorneys who already felt stretched to their
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limits. Still, management emphasized that grants would ensure that inter-
esting and important work could continue. It circulated frequent memo-
randa to staff and Board members with good news about fundraising suc-
cesses and praise for staff involved in these efforts. These steps increased
the investment of staff and Board members in the fundraising process. In
accordance with the desire for increased and more sophisticated fund-
raising, management hired a fundraising consultant. The executive direc-
tor, fiscal director, and director of planning spent a substantial portion of
their time working with the consultant and meeting with funders. A new,
polished brochure was developed to promote the organization. In addi-
tion, significant efforts were made to woo new donors and increase sup-
port from existing ones.
Ultimately, CLS culture changed significantly as CLS obtained a
broader funding base and became more savvy in seeking funding. For ex-
ample, instead of applying for funding for a wide variety of projects, each
of which would require new and different proposals and separate sub-
stantive, accounting, and reporting requirements, CLS focused primarily
on a single major substantive fundraising initiative, beginning with wel-
fare reform. CLS asked potential funders to support a portion of the
project. This strategy allowed CLS to use virtually the same proposal,
tailored slightly for each potential funder's particular interests or re-
quirements, for numerous grant applications. Moreover, when the pro-
posals were successful, as a majority were, the substantive, reporting, and
accounting requirements were minimized. As importantly, the selection
of a fundraising priority project helped to ensure that CLS staff focused
its efforts on projects considered to be most pressing.
Law firm fundraising also reached a new high, spurred in part by two
generous matching grants from a local foundation and the continuing ef-
forts of the Board and Bar Association. CLS explored other fundraising
mechanisms, including expanded efforts to raise funds from individuals
and local churches. At the same time, CLS struggled to improve its fund-
raising database and to routinize its efforts. Eventually, it hired its first
development director.
In the final aspect of its restructuring, CLS management pushed to
improve its own performance and administration of the program. Ad-
ministrative staff had been reduced disproportionately in the layoffs. The
remaining administrative staff was forced to be more efficient. One obvi-
ous efficiency came out of the improved budget situation. Staff no longer
spent significant time warding off creditors and prioritizing bill payments.
Similarly, an improved budget allowed the organization to purchase reli-
able technology, install an advanced computer network and software,
and provide appropriate training.
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The need to adjust management to the new organization required
painful changes. A major management change had occurred in June of
1995, when the organization's well respected and long time Executive Di-
rector resigned. He had taken over the organization at a time of a drastic
funding deficit and guided it through multiple crises through the years.
The new Executive Director had no previous management experience,
but came out of the attorneys' union and was the first woman to lead the
organization. Because the new Director was an outsider to the existing
management team, and because the union attorney staff harbored signifi-
cant discontent with that management, there was much staff expectation
that the new Director would change the management structure. Indeed,
much of the input from legal staff throughout the transition process re-
flected hopes that the changes mandated by the federal restrictions and
funding reduction would be accompanied by other managerial and struc-
tural changes. Part of the discontent reflected a problem common to legal
services organizations and other professional firms: generally, promotion
into management positions resulted from outstanding performance as a
litigator, but litigation expertise did not necessarily correlate to interest
or skill in management.
To address these concerns, the new CLS needed managers willing to
spend more time managing. Their responsibilities could not simply con-
sist of providing creative ideas for advocacy strategies, but required
dealing with staff problems, performing staff evaluations, and working on
such mundane issues as timekeeping, filekeeping, office space, absentee-
ism, case management, intake schedules, and grant proposals and reports.
The Director merged the responsibility for smaller units under one man-
aging attorney and ensured that each member of the management team
was committed to addressing pressing management issues. In addition,
during a union contract negotiation, a plan was devised to rationalize the
supervisory attorney system. Management salaries, which had been dis-
parate and idiosyncratic and thus a source of staff annoyance, were made
more equitable. A human resources director was hired. Moreover, man-
agement finally committed itself to a list of priorities to improve its own
performance, including management training.
III. CHANGES IN SUBSTANTIVE ADVOCACY STRATEGIES
CLS also altered its approach to substantive work. Staff began focus-
ing less on traditional litigation strategies and more on administrative,
legislative, and other policy advocacy. This shift of emphasis developed in
response to an increasingly conservative and unsupportive federal judici-
ary, and attacks on poverty programs in the legislative and administrative
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arenas." Moreover, the respect and expertise CLS had gained over almost
three decades of aggressive client representation meant its staff had in-
fluence in the policy arena. This new work required more collaboration
both with legal services colleagues and the broader nonprofit community.
In 1996, advocates for Pennsylvania's poor faced an overwhelming range
of urgent and complex new client needs as a result of the passage of state
and federal welfare reform, housing law amendments, and other changes.
Because of the breadth of issues being addressed, sharing work among
the different specialty units at CLS became more commonplace. Moreo-
ver, the tremendous reduction in attorney staff at CLS forced overbur-
dened advocates to look for support beyond their own drastically dimin-
ished units. In addition, since CLS casehandlers were now housed in only
two offices rather than spread out across the city, communication and
collaboration became easier.
CLS's response to welfare reform provides the most comprehensive
example of collaboration across units and specialties.! In addition to the
public benefits staff that had previously handled all health and welfare
issues independently, staff from the employment and consumer units be-
came part of the welfare reform response team. All issues were divided
up among the team members with frequent meetings to ensure the con-
stant flow of information. CLS's employment staff saw protections in the
employment law area as the last safety net for poor people who no longer
had access to public benefits programs. The team focused on issues in-
cluding welfare recipients' rights in workfare programs, utilizing em-
ployee protections such as the Family and Medical Leave Act,10 and
maximizing clients' access to unemployment compensation and pension
funds. CLS's consumer lawyers provided expertise and advocacy on stu-
dent loan and job training issues. Staff from the public benefits, con-
sumer, and employment units all worked with government officials and
other advocates to design a public jobs program. In addition to bolstering
the work of CLS's public benefits staff, the employment and consumer
attorneys' involvement in welfare reform advocacy and greater under-
standing of the welfare system made them more effective in responding
to their clients' traditional consumer and employment law needs.
8. CLS's shift in emphasis from litigation to other forms of advocacy certainly does not
mean that CLS has abandoned its use of traditional litigation remedies when they are appropri-
ate and effective. CLS attorneys continue to pursue class action and attorney fees cases in a
number of areas, including consumer and housing law. Recent class action litigation in these
areas has included a challenge to the new state landlord-tenant law restricting indigent clients'
rights to appeal, actions challenging ongoing consumer fraud, and challenges to the state's dura-
tional residency requirements for welfare benefits.
9. For a comprehensive discussion of this work, see Sharon M. Dietrich et al., Welfare Ad-
vocacy: Tactics for a New Era, 31 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 419 (1998).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.
Yale Law & Policy Review
Although CLS had always collaborated with a wide range of client
and advocacy groups, the advent of vast welfare reform made such part-
nerships all the more essential and effective. CLS reached out to new po-
tential allies such as child care providers, community colleges, and or-
ganized labor, as well as traditional partners such as women's groups,
domestic violence advocates, welfare rights organizations, and consumer
groups. This collaboration offered two obvious advantages. First, advo-
cates could put forth a united front at a critical time. Second, other
groups often had different contacts than CLS and so could jointly ad-
vance an advocacy agenda more effectively than CLS could alone.
Among CLS's most effective collaborations was its work with the City of
Philadelphia and the State on welfare issues in which the government
shared common goals with CLS's clients. The City, like other localities,
feared that changes in welfare would require it to provide additional
costly services to those who fell through cracks. The Mayor's Chief of
Staff invited CLS to join a Block Grant Response Team including gov-
ernment officials, advocates, and service providers. This forum gave CLS
attorneys the opportunity to gather information and to push client initia-
tives CLS had identified. For example, CLS encouraged the Mayor to
recommend to the Governor that he seek a waiver of new limitations on
food stamp eligibility for high unemployment areas of the state. The
Governor acted quickly on the suggestion, and Pennsylvania ultimately
received one of the first such waivers in the country, preserving millions
of dollars of food stamps for poor Pennsylvanians. While CLS could have
made the suggestion independently, the Mayor's appeal was far more ef-
fective. Moreover, the successful collaboration between the City and CLS
strengthened a relationship that had been tested by past conflicts.
CLS continues to work constructively with the City, and has received
a substantial increase in City funding to support its work. While much of
CLS's welfare reform work put it at odds with Pennsylvania's Depart-
ment of Public Welfare, on some issues it was able to advance its clients'
interests by working cooperatively with the Department. For many years,
CLS has participated in numerous Department Advisory Committees.
CLS used these Committees to provide technical assistance on the details
of the food stamp waiver request and to work closely with the State on
the shared goal of preserving federally funded SSI benefits for children
with disabilities. On the latter issue, CLS not only participated in an in-
tergovernmental work group regarding SSI, but also designed and deliv-
ered training for welfare caseworkers and other staff. In addition, CLS
assisted the Department in contacting every family whose child had been
terminated from SSI as a result of changes in federal law so that those
terminations could be appealed.
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CLS also focused more attention on client education. Because many
CLS clients were either misinformed about or unaware of the many
changes in welfare law and policy, they were unable to negotiate the sys-
tem successfully. During the early implementation of welfare reform, cli-
ents more often required education than actual representation on welfare
issues. Moreover, CLS and PLA's drastically diminished public benefits
staff could handle only a limited number of welfare cases. CLS therefore
organized large group trainings and developed straightforward written
materials that were widely distributed to welfare recipients. Community
education efforts continue to evolve as the progression of welfare reform
creates new client needs. CLS also assumed an important role in provid-
ing updated information and analysis on welfare reform developments to
advocates and service providers. Staff organized open monthly briefings
in response to a barrage of speaking requests. These well-attended ses-
sions allowed staff to concentrate their education efforts and to share
their advocacy strategies and goals. In addition, the meetings provided
valuable feedback and enabled CLS to identify new allies.
While the response to welfare reform provides the most dramatic ex-
ample of new collaborations and advocacy strategies, other staff at CLS
has moved in similar directions. For example, CLS has for many years
had a contract with the City to provide representation for parents at risk
of having their children removed from their care. The Dependency Unit
that provided representation in these cases had for a long time been
somewhat isolated from the rest of CLS. The staff was physically located
in the Family Court building instead of a CLS office and casehandlers
were overwhelmed by huge caseloads that left them little time to engage
in advocacy aside from individual representation. As part of the man-
agement and substantive changes at CLS, the unit, renamed the Family
Advocacy Unit, moved to CLS's main office and expanded its work to
address the systemic problems clients faced. The staff is making efforts to
collaborate on a regular basis with public benefits and housing staff to
address issues that increase clients' chances of retaining their parental
rights. Common issues include access to health and mental health serv-
ices as the Medicaid system switches to a managed care model, the im-
pact of welfare reform on troubled families, and access to low income
housing. In addition, staff is struggling to better balance advocacy initia-
tives and individual cases.
CLS is also expanding advocacy efforts beyond its traditional con-
cerns. For example, in the fall of 1998, CLS gained a Skadden Fellow
who is exploring how to integrate CLS's current substantive expertise on
housing, consumer, public benefits, employment and utilities issues into
local community economic development efforts. Although CLS has never
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previously played more than a peripheral role in these efforts, it recog-
nizes the importance of lending its expertise as poor communities re-
spond to governmental pressures to shift people from welfare to work in
neighborhoods with few jobs and opportunities.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1996 split between CLS and PLA is beginning to feel like ancient
history to the Philadelphia legal services community. Both organizations
have hired new attorneys and support staff who had no contact with the
old CLS and view the new structures as normal. Yet the restrictions and
their impact affect every staff person every day. While CLS continues to
serve as a model for legal services programs throughout the nation, many
old organizational struggles still continue. Perhaps the most important is
the ongoing need to balance individual cases (where the obvious and
immediate needs are visible each morning in crowded waiting rooms)
with broader efforts to effectuate change (such as class actions or admin-
istrative advocacy). And like all legal services programs, CLS must con-
tinue to walk an old political tightrope as it tries zealously to represent
clients in suits against federal, state, and local governments while also
keeping those governments convinced of the value of funding legal serv-
ices. The government funding cutbacks have added new struggles. Cli-
ents, staff and board members debate how to better reach neighborhoods
CLS used to serve through local offices when there is not enough staff to
serve those who walk into the remaining office doors. Leaders in both
agencies still work to minimize the conflict and competition of two inde-
pendent organizations serving the same population of poor people. CLS's
changes in culture are all works in progress, demanding constant atten-
tion.
The new reliance on fundraising, requirements for timekeeping, and
resource limitations mean CLS must spend more time coordinating its
work with its funding sources, while at the same time trying to do the
most important and effective work for Philadelphia's poor. Funding cri-
ses are always on the horizon. The past year witnessed a worrisome Su-
preme Court decision on IOLTA funding" and a struggle over the Social
Services Block Grant, a multimillion dollar source of legal services fund-
ing in Pennsylvania. Staff members seem more burdened than ever. Yet
11. In Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998), the Supreme Court
held that the interest income generated by client funds held by attorneys in bank accounts is the
private property of the clients. The Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit, however, to
decide whether the payment of that interest income to foundations that support legal services
programs constitutes an unconstitutional "taking" by the state. If that crucial question is re-
solved in the affirmative, legal services programs may ultimately lose millions of dollars of
IOLTA funding.
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with determination and dedication, CLS continues to serve clients with
often overwhelming problems. Indeed it is ultimately those clients, their
needs, and their courage to survive that keeps CLS moving forward to-
ward the goal of providing access to justice for all.

